University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
FMHI Publications

Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute
(FMHI)

12-1-1993

Social response to the second "A" alert of the
Parkfield Earthquake prediction experiment
Paul W. O'Brien

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/fmhi_pub
Part of the Mental and Social Health Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
O'Brien, Paul W., "Social response to the second "A" alert of the Parkfield Earthquake prediction experiment" (1993). FMHI
Publications. Paper 20.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/fmhi_pub/20

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute (FMHI) at Scholar Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in FMHI Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

HAZARD HOUSE COpy
SOC\CA..\

R.es~V\s.e.

+-0

~~ 'S'e.c..(""\~

+'t.e.. -:p.... oQ.~~\e.\e\

."AU Alell!..-\- ()f

fQ..~~~IJ-A.Ie.-4t.. ~«.~J..\C+\O,,\ E)(pet2.(~
--:P~v-\

-

w.

6 J 1S (L\-e..",
HAZARD HOUSE CO~'{

k1:rrrtb CwIef( Cory /
lAV\"
ot-

i<!.t?-s,

S

0

l~~v\o~et

1+fA.'Z,.cuu\s

~ Co \0 o<2.A.cl eo .I

\

SCl~-( I

t.es e..~

tt..I'I,.

:r s +r t""Jt..
V\

~~tL{

& A- p pl. ca...tl tlM.S

rV\~04..~~~t~t'\ ~+~~

d. \A.\ c.1c.

R<l.s, ~dV\S~

f/{OM

I<.es.~ ~epe,f 1I(f;s-

LJ pRl'rf<"

Social Response to the Secon4 "A" Alert of the Parkfiel4
Earthquake pre4iction Expert-ent

By
Paul W. O'Brien

QUICK RESPONSE RESEARCH REPORT #65

1994

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not
necessarily those of the Natural Hazards Center or the University
of Colorado.
. . .
rt f the Natural Hazards
.
This publication I~ p~ 0 I formation Center's ongoing
Research & Applications ~ Report Series.
Quick Response Researc
http://WWW·colorado.edu/hazards

social Response to the Second "A" Alert or the ParJtrield
BarthquaJte Prediction Experiaent

Final Report

Paul w. O'Brien, Ph.D.
California state University-Stanislaus
Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice
801 west Monte vista Ave
Turlock, CA 95382

Submitted to:
The Natural Hazards Research and
Applications Information Center
Boulder, CO

December 1993

The author of this report wishes special thanks to the San Luis Obispo Office of Emergency Services for
making their staff available for multiple interviews and for sharing documents received by them from the
Governor's Office of Emergency Services in Sacramento, CA during the Alert.

This
page
•

IS

blank
or
•
•
mIssIng

Introduction
Parkfield, California is a small village of 34 residents
located approximately 220 miles south of San Francisco and 240
miles north of Los Angeles. This places the village in the center
of the state. What makes the village unique to seismologists and
others interested in earthquake related issues is that it
experiences earthquakes with an uncanny regularity. Using
historical records, one can anticipate an earthquake almost every
22 years. To date earthquakes have occurred in Parkfield in 1857,
1881, 1901, 1922, 1934, and 1966. Given this past history it was
selected by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to be part
of an experiment.
The experiment was a bold plan by the USGS to use Parkfield
in an extensive effort to predict earthquakes. The logic was
simple. Since Parkfield experiences earthquakes with such
regularity, what one needed to do was to be ready for the next
quake. Once instruments were in place seismologists could measure
every earth movement and change, limited only by modern
technology, to see exactly what happens in an earthquake.
with this knowledge of all possible anomalies that occur
shortly before an earthquake, one could then look for those same
anomalies elsewhere to predict earthquakes at other locations.
Some of the instruments in the stUdy includes: creep meters to
detect earth surface slippage, laser guided survey equipment to
detect earth movement over large land areas, and ground water
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detection devices. To date considerable resources of the USGS and
the State of California been allocated to the project in the hope
of furthering American earthquake prediction capabilities.
Parkfield

itsel~

is hardly in danger. The village of 34 has

a long history of seismic activity. Residents have learned to
deal with earthquakes. There is even a certain amount of pride
that goes along with all of the attention residents receive. This
is shown, for example, on the water tower in town, which proudly
proclaims Parkfield to be "the earthquake capital of the world".
In addition there is little to be damaged in the farm countryside
surrounding Parkfield. If, however, the next earthquake should be
larger than the characteristic 6.0R temblor, for example in the
7.0R range, then the threat to human life increases. The larger
earthquake could have potential damaging impacts in the counties
of Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, San Benito, Monterey, Kings,
Kern, and Fresno. One area of particular concern is the nuclear
power plant located outside San Luis Obispo.
The original announcement by the USGS that it was embarking
on this bold plan was made in 1985. It was watched by many here
and abroad for its long-range implications in earthquake
prediction. The undertaking proceeded with the endorsement by the
National (NEPEC) and California (CEPEC) Earthquake Prediction and
Evaluation Councils. The prediction was for an earthquake of
magnitude 6.0-7.0R to occur before the end of 1993.
Parallel to the USGS effort at Parkfield were social
scientists also looking at the experiment from a pUblic response
4

viewpoint. The initial public reaction to the prediction was
formally investigated shortly after it was pUblicly announced
(Mileti and Hutton 1987).
Since that initial social study, others have been completed.
Specifically the California Governor's Office of Emergency
. Services distributed a brochure to the seven county region. It
detailed a description of the USGS experiment, preparedness, and
mitigation activities, where to get additional information and an
explanation of the alert levels. Social scientists were actively
involved in measuring how effective the model of risk
communication was (Mileti, Fitzpatrick and Farhar 1990, Mileti
and Fitzpatrick 1992, Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1993).
Since that 1985 date, Parkfield has been the center of much
activity and media coverage. This attention climaxed on October
20, 1992, when, based on pre-planned models of earth activity,
the USGS issued an A-level alert. This was an historic event for
the first NEPEC/CEPEC approved prediction issued in the history
of the united States. This alert also provided social scientists
the opportunity to measure public response to this alert
(Fitzpatrick and O'Brien 1992).
Considerable media attention was focused on the Parkfield
area around the October 20, 1992, event. The alert came and
passed without the predicted earthquake. Although the scientific
community openly acknowledged some

disappo~ntment,

offices of

emergency services reported that even without the anticipated
event, many of the people in the seven county region were once
5

again reminded that this is earthquake country and one always
needs to be prepared. Many saw the A-alert not as a failure, but
a call to preparedness and mitigation action. Social research
also found that the pUblic also knew that this not yet an exact
science and did not "hold-a-grudge" against the USGS for them
having called the alert in the first place (Fitzpatrick and
O'Brien 1992).
On November 14, 1993, the second A-alert was announced by
the USGS. The alert was called after a 4.5R magnitude earthquake
struck the area. From the monitoring instruments located in
Parkfield, it was felt that the larger G.OR to 7.0R earthquake
might occur. Again the USGS notified the California Governor's
Office of Emergency Services (OES), who in turn notified the
seven county OES offices in the effected areas. This report is a
result of that second A-alert.

Purpose
This second A-alert represents a unique opportunity to
measure both public and organizational response to a short-term
earthquake prediction sanctioned by both the NEPEC and the CEPEC
for the second time. Many aspects of Parkfield are based on the
historical record since earthquake prediction is still such a new
endeavor. Each action that the USGS and other players in the
event take are taken for the first time and. thus offer great
insights into actions and reactions of all those involved.

G

In order to measure some of the responses to the second Aalert, a sociologist was sent to the area to investigate some of
the societal dynamics surrounding the event. This field trip was
supported by National Science Foundation funds that are
distributed by the Natural Hazards Research and Applications
Information Center located at the University of Colorado at
Boulder. It sent one researcher from California State Universitystanislaus to central California to collect data on the event.
This was done almost immediately after the announcement so that
the data could be collected as the actual event unfolded.
The primary purpose of this research was to investigate the
social response to the A-alert. Specifically the public was
targeted to form the core of the project. In addition,
governmental agencies and the private sector were questioned
about what effect, if any, the A-alert had on them. Questions
asked can be broken down into three general categories including:
1)

How did the pUblic respond to the 72 hour warning? Did
the pUblic take it seriously and did they engage in
preparedness activitie~?

2)

What was the official government response? Did agencies
prepare for a possible earthquake?

3)

How does this alert differ from that of one year ago?
Have government agencies, the private sector and the
pUblic changed their attitudes toward the Parkfield
Prediction Experiment, the California Office of
Emergency services, and the USGS with the issuing of a
second alert that did not occur?

7

These three areas were the focus points in this research.
The concluding sections of this paper detail the alert itself,
the response by different entities and finally conclusions.

The Alert

During the initial years of the prediction experiment
criteria were established as to what constitutes an alert. Based
on work by the CEPEC and the Parkfield Earthquake Prediction
Response Plan, issued by the California Governor's Office of
Emergency Services in 1988, six levels of alert status were
established. Important to this study are the three highest levels
C, B and the highest level A. When the USGS predicts that there
is at least a 37 percent chance of a typical Parkfield earthquake
in a 72-hour time frame the A-alert is issued. A B-alert means an
11 to 37 percent likelihood of an earthquake in a 72-hour time
period. The C level is a 2.8 to 11 percent chance of an
earthquake occurring in the 72-hour time frame. All occurrences
therefore are for a 72-hour time period, however, the highest
likelihood is immediately following the announcement of an alert
and slowly deteriorates as time passes (Governor's Office of
Emergency Services, 1988).
There have been several B- and C-alerts issued over the life
of the experiment. These are only given minor attention by both
the public and the media. On October 19, 1992, the USGS issued
the first A-alert. This was acted upon by the California
Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES). Societal lessons
8

learned from that experience have been documented (Fitzpatrick
and O'Brien, 1992).
The second alert came from the California state Director of
OES in Sacramento on November 14, 1993, at 5:49 am. The message
read: "The USGS informed the Governor's Office of Emergency
Services today that there is a significant likelihood that an
earthquake of about magnitude 6R will occur on the San Andreas
fault near Parkfield in the next 72 hours". This message was sent
to all seven county OES offices located in the effected region.
This alert was issued after a 4.8R earthquake occurred at 4:25 am
the morning of November 14, 1993, within four miles of Parkfield
(OESa 1993).
The State OES office alerted its county offices through the
teletype and then via fax communications. The San Luis Obispo
County Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the OES Southern and
Inland regions' EOCs and the State Operations Center activated on
minimal staffing. Monterey, Fresno, Kern, Kings, San Benito, and
Santa Barbara counties were all on standby, although Kern county
activated its EOC briefly the first day (OESb 1993). The local
county OES offices began their standard procedures. The first
being a call down procedure. This notifies police and fire
departments. In addition, city managers and other high level
county and local authorities are notified. Once these actions
were taken the OES offices answered
the media and waited.

9

questi~ns

from the public and

Research Methodology

This research proceeded within days of the USGS announcement
of the A-alert •. In order to get into the field to collect
perishable data,

qu~litative

data collection methods were

utilized. Upon arrival at the targeted area the interview process
began immediately. This allowed for the immediate gathering of
data on the A-alert before people left the area and pUblic
reaction waned with time.
Towns included in this study are: San Luis Obispo, Paso
Robles, Coalinga, and Parkfield. This included San Luis Obispo,
Kings, and Fresno counties. Data collection concentrated on these
three counties since they are in closest proximity to the San

.

Andreas fault where the predicted earthquake was most likely to
occur. In addition, Paso Robles was seen as a town which lacked
recent experience with earthquakes; Coalinga, the opposite,
having experienced a damaging earthquake in 1983. A total of 18
interviews with officials and dozens with the pUblic were
completed during the field work.
The sample included three different units of analysis. The
first were public officials who are responsible for the
protection of the pUblic. These pUblic officials came from all
levels of government. Local city, county, and state officials
were interviewed in the course of this research. Examples
included: police, fire, California Highway
county Offices of Emergency Services.

10

~atrol

(CHP), and

The second group of interviews were conducted with the
business sector. Members of this group included: stores in all
areas of retail trade, banks, and a variety of service industry
businesses. All of these business were selected with the
following purpose. It is thought that these service industry
businesses would be more sensitive to the societal effect of the
A-alert than the manufacturing sector which does not have daily
contact with the general public.
Finally the third group included a wide cross-section of the
general pUblic. Interviews with the pUblic form the core of this
project. Their actions, reactions, and personal perceptions of
the pUblic response to the Alert were seen as the central focus
of this investigation. Members of different sexes, racial and
ethnic backgrounds, and social classes were sought for the widest
cross section of respondents possible. This goal was realized
over the course of the data COllection.
Data were collected conducting unstructured interviews. With
the limited numbers and kinds of interviews completed, the data
collected can not be generalized beyond the limited
geographically A-alert area.

Findings

Police, fire, and offices of the CHP all have specific
instruction on what to do, and how to perfqrm. They followed
their standard pre-scripted procedures. Offices of Emergency
Services perform a special role in these events. They form the
11

core communication set-up for all other agencies and train for
these types of incidents on an on-going basis. Again, as with the
past A-alert, OES offices performed as planned. They did their
notification process. and several counties set up their EOCs. Also
central to their mission is fielding phone calls from the public
about what the alert means for them.
The state OES office activated the state Operations Center
in Sacramento. In addition, it alerted, and activated the
regional EOCs. Lastly the state sent a limited number of
personnel to Parkfield to coordinate the state's activities and
to be available for the media.
The USGS also activated some of its emergency plans once the
announcement of the Alert became known. The USGS made staff
available, in its Menlo Park headquarters, to answer questions.
In addition, the USGS also sent personnel to Parkfield to
coordinate activities and to make itself available to the media.
The media played a central role in the unfolding event
surrounding the A-alert. Both radio and television began running
earthquake stories immediately following the official
announcement of the alert. This was followed up by a large number
of stories about the alert itself, inclUding mitigation, and
preparedness activities that the public could and should take. In
interviews with residents, widespread praise of the media's quick
response and thorough reporting on and about the event was noted.
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This was also true for the print media. It was impossible to
pick up a newspaper during a five day period that did not have an
alert or alert related article. The event was taken very
seriously by the

pri~t

media and considerable space was allotted

to the story. Some editorials questioned the alert process
itself, but these articles were an exceedingly small proportion
of all the articles that printed.
This high level of professional media involvement is the
result of several alerts. The media has had the opportunity to
interact with government authorities on several occasions now and
a close working relationship is obvious. The actors in all areas
of the alert are gaining an understanding of each other and this
researcher feels that a level of trust is developing. In
addition, the public wants information and the media tries to
fill that desire.
Business organizations were interviewed in the affected
areas. The cities of San Luis Obispo and Paso Robles reported
business as usual following the alert. There was, however, a
different response in Coalinga. Businesses in Coalinga did take
preparedness actions, and reported the same for the pUblic.
Businesses reported not only their heightened awareness, but that
the pUblic responded by purchasing water, batteries, and other
emergency supplies. The reason for the different response is
thought to lie in the fact that Coalinga has had a recent (1983)
damaging earthquake unlike the other cities. This experience
keeps the threat of possible damage at a higher level of
13

awareness. This theory has been borne out by other research
(Fitzpatrick and O'Brien, 1992).
The public response varied by location as noted above in the
business response to the alert. Depending on where one was
located had a real impact on the level of preparedness.
Preparedness was highest in Coalinga and lowest in San Luis
Obispo and Paso Robles. Everyone knew of the alert, but few
actually took concrete actions to prepare for it.
Of all interviews completed, not one suggested that the
prediction experiment should not proceed. There were many,
however, who were beginning to question the chances of the USGS
having success with the project. The public can be broken down
into three distinct groups. The first believed the alert and took
preparedness actions as recommended by their local OES offices.
The second group simply did not and does not believe that
earthquake prediction is possible and used that as a
justification to ignore information given out by a variety of
sources. This group was in the minority, but nevertheless,
sizable.
The final group of the pUblic uses the USGS predictions
literally. They followed recommendations and give the USGS credit
for perhaps more prediction capabilities than they really have.
If there is an alert, then they go on a higher level of
awareness. Conversely, when there is no USGS alert in effect,
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then there is no danger. This group lives in real danger in that
they use the USGS alert system as a fail-safe system for their
safety. If no alert is "on" then no danger exists.
This final group and its reactions to the alert is thought
to be the major finding coming out of this Quick Response Grant.
As noted before, many findings coming out of the Parkfield
Prediction Experiment are new and unique, given the uniqueness of
the project itself. Never before has a public had to deal with a
possible earthquake prediction and subsequent alerts. How the
pUblic responds to alerts is of great importance to pUblic
safety. Recommendations on how to deal with this segment of the
population appear in the final conclusion section.
CODclusioDs

The alert process is working well in central California. The
'USGS alerts the Governor's Office of Emergency Services, which in
turn notifies all of its effected regions. This process worked
well in the first A-alert of October 19, 1992, and again on
November 14, 1993.
with all the attention focused on the Parkfield area and the
A-alerts, several new problems have arisen. One of the main
barriers to be overcome is what are the USGS and the Governor's
Office of Emergency Services to do in the future? Working
together they have now issued two A-alerts, neither of which has
resulted in the "promised" earthquake. Many- people reported that
a "cry-wolf" syndrome might eventually happen in the area, but
that is not yet the case. Both organizations enjoy wide-spread
15

support among the public, especially the USGS. Whether this will
remain the case is yet to be seen.
Social research on the "cry wolf" syndrome has been carried
out. Its conclusion is that if false alerts are given to the
pUblic there can be an adverse effect. The way to avoid the
negative affect is to explain to the pUblic why there were false
alarms (Sorensen and Mileti, 1989 p.360). This is an area where
both the USGS and the California Office of Emergency Services
needs to put their emphasis following this second alert.
How many alerts, however, will it take? One more, three
being the number or perhaps four or maybe five? This question was
asked during all interviews. All had a different "magical"
number, but threat or fear of one too many false alerts is real
among the pUblic, government, and the private sector. Thus the
explaining of the false alerts needs to be a top priority of all
involved agencies. The experiment itself is taking science into
new uncharted territories and this holds true for government, the
private sector and the pUblic. Unfortunately no one has a crystal
baIlor prior experience to guide them in the best course of
action to take at this juncture. The limited past experience, as
noted above, would strongly suggest a steady flow of information
to the public as the best course of action.
The USGS and the Governor's Office of Emergency Services now
find themselves in an uncomfortable position: what to do when the
anomalies present themselves in the future. What different
actions do these organizations, charged with the pUblic's
16

welfare, do in that event? To issue the alert is the responsible
thing to do. Losing their credibility is the danger to these
organizations. A succession of false alerts could also create a
pUblic that no

longe~

bothers to prepare and mitigate.

The other possible scenario is as unappealing: if the
anomalies again present themselves and the USGS in conjunction
with the State OES office were to do nothing. To further
complicate the process and an earthquake strikes, what would be
the end result? Naturally there would be a full investigation of
why the pUblic was not warned. The USGS and State OES risk
political annihilation, depending on the severity of the
earthquake. Thus the USGS and state OES office are in a very
uncomfortable and potentially dangerous Catch 22.
Any scientists and most people in the emergency management
field know what an experiment is. It is not something that is
guaranteed, rather it is an attempt to learn new lessons. That
distinction between something that is guaranteed and something
that is for knowledge acquisition is lost on many in the general
pUblic. When they hear earthquake alert, they react to that and
not that this is an experiment. Perhaps public education is
needed now more than ever by the USGS and other governmental
organizations directed at the public.
The State OES office is aware of this and have called for a
re-evaluation of the entire alert process •. This will be easier
said then done. One new possible approach won almost instant
approval from the local OES offices interviewed. One of the
17

state's regional people equated the prediction to the weather
forecast. When the state issues an A-alert it should mean that
there is a higher chance of an earthquake, but not a guarantee of
one. This would not be unlike the weather forecast that predicts
a 30 percent chance of rain. Once rain is predicted does that
mean that the pUblic panics and stops their lives? No, rather it
means that one takes prudent measures, e.g., take a raincoat when
one goes out. In the event of the predicted earthquake one would
not stop living. Rather one would take prudent measures to
protect oneself, and one's family and property.
But this advice also carries potential risk. While reading a
newspaper in a restaurant about the alert, the waitress came over
and said not to worry about earthquakes since the alert was over.
Many of the public are already taking these alerts like weather
reports. If there is no report then there is no danger. Naturally
this is not the case. But many in central California are now
using the USGS alert system as a way to deny risk. It won't
happen if the USGS hasn't announced it. This is leaving a pUblic
at risk open to danger if they feel that nothing is guaranteed to
happen if the USGS doesn't say so.
Public information is seen as playing a key role in two
major problems that have come out of this second alert. The first
problem is dealing with the false alerts and the second problem
being people taking the alerts literally. Common to both problems
is a pUblic that is making decisions based on no or poor
information. The solution appears to be to keep the lines of
18

communication between the USGS and the State OES with the public
an ongoing process. The USGS has been at the forefront of using
basic principles of risk communication in its public outreach
efforts to inform the pUblic. The USGS needs to redouble its
efforts to ensure success of the Parkfield Prediction Experiment.
State OES is in a unique position to have local staff throughout
the affected region, which lends itself to a more effective
outreach if it is tasked to do so by majors powers within that
organization.
This alert leaves more questions than answers. There are
many things that now needed to be dealt with before the next
event.

A coherent strategy needs to be devised that all parties

are a part. Only in this way can the experiment proceed with the
necessary autonomy it needs to be successful. The private sector
and pUblic are willing to give USGS scientists time to have
success in the area. The pUblic ultimately knows the value of
earthquake prediction. It is a public that has experience with
earthquakes in varying degrees and will give the USGS the benefit
of the doubt. It is not, however, a pUblic that will endure
endless alerts without negative effects. The USGS and state OES
need to devise a realistic policy that is understood by the
pUblic and the pUblic will support it.
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